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THE APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
JURISPRUDENCE TO CYBERSPACE DISPUTES
William C. Walter*
Deanne M. Mosley**
"Ishot an arrow into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where;
For, so swiftly it flew, the sight
Could not follow it in its flight."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the Internet2 and cyberspace 3 has presented courts
with many issues of first impression.4 It has been suggested that no issue is more
important than cyberspace jurisdiction, in which electronic activity subjects a
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Point, New York (B.S. 1986); University of Mississippi (J.D. 1995 cum laude).
**Deanne M. Mosley, Associate, Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, P.A.; University of Mississippi (B.P.A.
1991 magna cum laude); University of Mississippi (J.D. 1994).
1. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Arrow and the Song.
2. "The Internet is the world's largest computer network, often described as a 'network of networks."'
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court
of the United States has described the Internet as "'a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication."' Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 n.4 (1997) (citing American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 E Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Congress has defined the "Internet" as
the "international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data net-
works." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Supp. 1998). Developed approximately 25 years ago by the Department of
Defense's Advanced Research Project Agency to link universities, government agencies, and other research
organizations' computer systems, the Internet served approximately 90 million individuals in 1997. Hasbro,
Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Mass. 1997).
3. The term "cyberspace" is generally accepted to be "a place 'without physical walls or even physical
dimensions' in which interaction occurs as if it happened in the real world and in real time, but constitutes only a
'virtual reality."' Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-Civ-3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *5 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997) (citations omitted). "Cyberspace" is an abbreviation for the "consensual hallucination that has
many aspects of physical space, but is merely computer-generated abstract data." Richard S. Zembek, Comment,
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Scs. &
TECH. 339, 343 n. 12 (1996). William Gibson, a science fiction author, is credited with creating the term "cyber-
space" in his novel, "Neuromancer." William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197, 198 n.5 (1995).
4. New issues have been raised regarding personal jurisdiction, copyrights, trademarks, and the First
Amendment. Hasbro, 994 E Supp. at 37. Cf Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., No. 79 Civ.
3525, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8435 (S.D.N.Y June 19, 1996) (finding that injunction against distribution of
magazine within United States also prohibited Internet distribution); Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "the long arm of the Internet reaches from California to New York. We hold
that the use of electronic mail and the telephone by a party in another state may establish sufficient minimum
contacts with California to support personal jurisdiction."); Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., 989
E Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that posting message on America Online bulletin board is not purposefully
or foresceably aimed at District of Columbia and does not constitute doing business under District of Columbia
long-arm statute); Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621, 623 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that trade
journal listing and maintenance of accessible Internet site "constitutes tortious injury resulting from the regular
solicitation of business under paragraph four of the Ohio Long Arm Statute"). In spite of these decisions, it is
undisputed that the development of the law in this area is in "its infant stages." Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 E Supp. 1119, 1123 (WD. Pa. 1997).
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non-resident defendant to liability in a distant forum.' The courts' struggle to
apply traditional jurisdictional jurisprudence, based upon geographic boun-
daries,6 to a seemingly infinite and boundary-less cyberspace7 has resulted in dif-
fering conclusions.8
This Article will examine the way in which courts have decided cyberspace
jurisdictional issues. As explained below, courts have invariably sought to
impose traditional personal jurisdictional rules upon the cyberspace disputes
before them, oftentimes with mixed results and outcomes. Before undertaking
that discussion, however, the Article reviews the well-established jurisprudence
which has evolved regarding personal jurisdiction.
II. TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE
In deciding whether it may properly assert jurisdiction over a defendant who
resides in a state other than the state in which the court sits, a court will engage
in a two-part analysis.' First, the forum state's law must provide for the assertion
5. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[tihe Internet represents perhaps the latest and
greatest manifestation of ... historical, globe-shrinking trends." CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
1262 (6th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, "there is less perceived need today for the federal constitution to protect
defendants from 'inconvenient litigation,' because all but the most remote forums are easily accessible for the
pursuit of both business and litigation." Id. (citations omitted).
6. It has been suggested that "[g]eography is not the touchstone of fairness. In an age when business is
routinely conducted by electronic technology, and air travel brings the two national coasts within hours of each
other, state boundaries are less relevant to the determination of fairness." Green v. William Mason & Co., 996
F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (D.N.J. 1998).
7. Cyberspace does not exist within a jurisdiction. See Zembek, supra note 3, at 342 n.7. Many view geog-
raphy as virtually meaningless to the Internet. See, e.g., American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F Supp. 160, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
It is probably safe to say that more ideas and information are shared on the Internet than in any
other medium. But when we try to pin down the location of this exchange, we realize how slippery
our notion of the Internet really is. Perhaps this is because "cyberspace" is not a "space" at all. At
least not in the way we understand space. It's not located anywhere; it has no boundaries; you can't
"go" there.
Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching An Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment In An
Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1996).
8. The courts that have examined personal jurisdiction and cyberspace are split. Hearst Corp. v.
Goldberger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has analogized that attempting to apply established legal precedents "in the fast-develop-
ing world of the internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus ...." Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). Also, many agree that imposing traditional jurisprudence upon cyber-
space subjects the web user to inconsistent regulation throughout the globe. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista
Tech., Inc., 960 F Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997). Calling the Internet the "legal battleground of the future,"
some commentators believe that the current legal system is an "inadequate" template. Sanford, supra note 7, at
1138. While some commentators have called for new jurisprudence to address cyberspace, others believe that
traditional jurisprudence has been sufficient in all cyberspace issues that have been raised. State of New York v.
Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). See also Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to
Court: Exercising Jurisdiction over World Wide Web Communications, 65 Fo, DHA L. REv. 2241, 2242 (1997)
(stating courts have faced challenges in applying traditional jurisdiction jurisprudence to Internet-related issues,
but traditional jurisdictional jurisprudence is sufficient to address these issues).
9. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 E2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 E2d
1162, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1985); KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 10.02[l] (Law Journal
Seminars-Press 1998). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial court may assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. General Equip. Mfrs. v. Coco Bros., Inc., 702 E Supp. 608, 610 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
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of jurisdiction." Second, the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant must be
constitutionally permissible in that it must comport with the requirements of due
process."
A. State Statutes Governing Jurisdiction
Some states' long-arm statutes simply allow jurisdiction over nonresidents to
the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 2 However, these statutes are not representative, as most states have enact-
ed long-arm statutes which specify the types of conduct which will enable their
courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 3 Mississippi's long-
arm statute, found at § 13-3-57 of the Mississippi Code, is more typical and pro-
vides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or
other corporation not qualified under the Constitution and law of this state as to
doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to
be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit
a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this
state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service
in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in
Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state.
14
10. Smith v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 743 F2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1984); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner,
473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973). When a federal court sits in diversity, it will apply the long-arm statute of
the state in which it is located. FED. R. Ci. P. 4(e); see Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Fava
Custom Applicators, Inc. v. Cummins Mid-America, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 224, 225 (N.D. Miss. 1995). See also
Bailiff v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 792 E Supp. 509, 510 (S.D. Miss. 1990) ("[a] defendant is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of a federal court in a diversity action only to the extent permitted a state court in the state
where that federal court sits").
11. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct.
691 (1998). The Allred court succinctly summarized this approach as follows: "'The state court or federal
court sitting in diversity may assert jurisdiction if: (1) the state's long-arm statute applies, as interpreted by the
state's courts; and (2) if due process is satisfied under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution."' Id. at 281 (quoting Cycles, Ltd. v. WJ. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also
Mitchell v. Random House, Inc., 703 E Supp. 1250, 1252 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 865 E2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989);
Martin & Martin v. Jones, 616 E Supp. 339, 341 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Allen v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 610 E Supp.
236, 238 (S.D. Miss. 1985). The second factor limits the power of a state's courts to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
12. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1999) (stating that "[a] court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States").
13. STucKEV, supra note 9, § 10.02[l]. See Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir.
1990); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 E3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996). The obvious
effect of these statutes is to permit state and federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of
due process. Dalton, 897 E2d at 1361.
14. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1998). Mississippi's long-arm statute has withstood constitutional
challenges on several occasions by out-of-state defendants caught in its snare. See, e.g., Edwards v. Associated
Press, 512 E2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that "the statute as construed does not offend the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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Thus, to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff, in
Mississippi, must do so under either the "contract," the "tort," or the "doing busi-
ness" prong of the statute."5 If the nonresident defendant's conduct can be char-
acterized as fitting into any of these categories, the defendant will be subject to
the jurisdiction of Mississippi's courts, provided that the assertion of such juris-
diction does not violate the Due Process Clause."
B. Due Process Analysis
Once a court determines that it may properly exercise jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant via the forum state's long-arm statute, the court must next test
the constitutionality of the exercise. As a general rule, the due process analysis
consists of the following two-part test: "(1) the nonresident defendant must have
certain minimum contacts with the forum state; and (2) subjecting the nonresi-
dent defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum state must be consistent with tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."18 This two-pronged analysis
was summarized by the United States Supreme Court, in 1984, as follows:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit the
power of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
.... Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is
asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has "certain minimum con-
tacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'... When a controversy is
15. See Murray v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 795 F Supp. 805, 807 (S.D. Miss. 1991); R. Clinton Constr.
Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 850 n.10 (N.D. Miss. 1977); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Doster, 211
So. 2d 813, 814 (Miss. 1968). The Mississippi Legislature amended the statute in 1980 to include the language
"or nonresident," which applies only to the "tort" prong of the statute. Herrley v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 957
F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1992). Numerous courts have held, however, that nonresidents may not utilize the
"doing business" portion of the statute to gain jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See Mills v. Dieco,
Inc., 722 E Supp. 296, 298 (N.D. Miss. 1989); Golden v. Cox Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 115, 117 (5th
Cir. 1982); Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1979). It has been stated that "the
law is perfectly clear that only the tort portion of the long-arm statute is available to non-resident[]" . . . plain-
tiffs. Cowart v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 911 E Supp. 248, 249 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
16. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, 636 So. 2d 668, 671 (Miss. 1994). Where a single contract
exists between the out-of-state defendant and a Mississippi plaintiff, jurisdiction is satisfied under the "con-
tract" provision of the long-arm statute. Id; see also Kaydee Metal Prods. Corp. v. Sintex Mach. Tool Mfg.
Corp., 342 F Supp. 902, 906 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 334 E Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Miss. 1971) (holding that the defendant need only commit a single tort within Mississippi to become subject to
the long-arm statute's reach). Moreover, the "tort" prong of the statute is satisfied when only part of the tort is
committed in Mississippi. Rippy v. Crescent Feed Commodities, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (S.D. Miss.
1988).
17. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F2d 1162, 1167 (5th Cir. 1985); Sorrells, 636 So. 2d at 672
(stating that "the next inquiry focuses upon the rights protected by the Due Process Clause and conformance
with those constitutional dictates").
18. Thompson, 755 F2d at 1168-69. These requirements have been set out over the years by a familiar
body of United States Supreme Court case law. Id. at 1168 n.6 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436
U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion).
1998] APPLICATION OF JURISPRUDENCE TO CYBERSPACE DISPUTES 217
related to or "arises out of" a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has
said that a "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" is
the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction ....
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the forum cor-
poration's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are suffi-
cient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation ... .
1. Minimum Contacts
In determining whether "minimum contacts"2 exist between the nonresident
defendant and the forum state, the court will look to the quantity and nature of
the defendant's contacts, the contacts' connection with the cause of action, and
the interest of the forum state in protecting its citizens.21
a. Specific Jurisdiction
As previously stated, when the claim sued upon arises out of or is directly
related to the defendant's forum-related activities, the defendant may be held to
have the "minimum contacts" necessary to sustain the assertion of jurisdiction by
the forum state's court.22 In such a case, the court is said to have "specific" or
"special" jurisdiction over the defendant.23  However, even if the lawsuit does
arise out of the nonresident defendant's activities within the forum, "specific
19. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 413-14 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Inter-
national Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
20. The purpose of the "minimum contacts" doctrine is to protect nonresident defendants from the burdens
of litigating in distant, inconvenient forums and to ensure that states do not reach beyond the limits imposed by
state sovereignty concepts of the federal system. See World-Wide Volkwagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
21. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186; Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9; Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
744 F2d 213 (lst Cir. 1984); Bumgarner v. Carlisle Med., Inc., 809 E Supp. 461,463 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (stating
that minimum contacts between nonresident defendant and forum state may be satisfied by either specific or
general jurisdiction); Angelica Corp. v. Gallery Mfg. Corp., 904 E Supp. 993 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Electro-
Catheter Corp. v. Surgical Specialties Instrument Co., Inc., 587 F Supp. 1446 (D.C.N.J. 1984); Campbell v.
Gasper, 102 ER.D. 159 (D.C. Nev. 1984).
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 (citing Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-64 (1966)); Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und
Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F3d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendant where defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of forum and litiga-
tion results from injuries which arise out of or relate to those activities); First Trust Nat'l Ass'n v. Jones, Walker,
Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, 996 F Supp. 585, 589 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (stating that courts may
assert "specific jurisdiction" over nonresident defendant whose purposeful contacts with forum state are related
to particular controversy at issue); First Miss. Corp. v. Thunderbird Energy, Inc., 876 E Supp. 840, 843 (S.D.
Miss. 1995) (stating that minimum contacts are satisfied by single act by which nonresident defendant purpose-
fully avails itself of privilege of conducting activities within forum state).
23. Glater, 744 E2d at 213; Hunt v. Erie Ins. Group, 728 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1984); Brainerd v. Governors
of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989); Sher v. Johnson, 911 E2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990); Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett & Tharpe, Inc., 786 E2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1986); Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake
Shore, Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989); Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 E2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986); see
generally Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913
(1985).
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jurisdiction" has additional requirements.24 If the defendant's "contacts" with the
forum are merely fortuitous, the court should refrain from exercising personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.25 Rather, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant purposefully directed its activities toward the residents of the forum state or,
in other words, "purposely availed" itself of the privilege of conducting business
or activities within that state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local
law.2" Moreover, the defendant must not only have been able to reasonably fore-
see that its activities may cause injury within the forum state,27 but "the foresee-
ability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there."28
b. General Jurisdiction
On the other hand, if the nonresident defendant engages in "systematic and
continuous" activity within the forum state, the court may hold that this is a suf-
24. See Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d 877, 884 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that, for "specific jurisdic-
tion" to lie, defendant must have purposely directed his activities at resident of forum); Bell Paper Box, Inc. v.
Trans Western Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that nonresident's contact with forum
must be more than random, fortuitous, or attenuated, and defendant must have purposefully availed itself of
privilege of conducting activities within forum state).
25. Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, to be subject to personal
jurisdiction based upon specific jurisdiction, nonresident defendant must engage in some form of affirmative
conduct allowing or promoting transaction of business within forum state). See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (Justice O'Connor, in a portion of her opinion for the Court that
was joined only by the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Scalia, wrote that "[tihe placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum state"). See also Sorrells v. R & R Coach Works, Inc., 636 So. 2d 668, 674 (Miss. 1994) (stating that
defendant's placing product into stream of commerce "does not constitute an act purposefully directed toward"
forum state); compare World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (stating that minimum contacts are estab-
lished where defendant placed "its products in the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum state").
26. See Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
It has been said that the "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that nonresidents are aware that they are
subject to suit in the forum state so that they can protect themselves against the expenses of litigating there by
buying insurance or, if the risks are too great, by severing their ties with that state. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 297. This requirement is satisfied "where the [forum-related] contacts proximately result from
actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); Terracom v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the "purposeful availment" requirement pre-
vents defendants from being haled into jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts);
Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp., 90 E3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1996).
27. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. This has been called the "effects" doctrine. See also
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 E3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998).
28. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Some courts apply a third factor in considering whether an
adequate basis for specific jurisdiction exists. For instance, in Panavision Int'l, the court stated:
We apply a three-part test to determine if a district court may exercise specific jurisdiction: (1) The
nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which
arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.
Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1320 (quoting Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batyggeri A/S, 52 E3d 267, 270 (9th
Cir. 1995)). However, the third factor listed above is not limited to the exercise of specific jurisdiction, but
applies to all analyses involving the assertion of personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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ficient basis for finding that the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the
forum state, even where the claim arises from the defendant's activities outside of
the state.29
2. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
If the court determines that the nonresident defendant has the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the forum state, it will then resolve the question of whether it
would be fair, just, and reasonable to require the defendant to defend itself in the
forum state. 0 In this portion of its analysis, the court will evaluate whether the
litigation would impose an undue burden on the out-of-state defendant,31 the con-
venience to the plaintiff, the efficient workings of the interstate legal system, and
the interests of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 2
III. APPLICATION TO CYBERSPACE
The application of this settled legal framework to disputes arising from cyber-
space poses interesting questions and problems. As one commentator suggested,
"the key issue in disputes arising in the online environment becomes whether the
electronic links between a defendant and the forum state qualify as conduct
required by the state's long-arm statute and constitute the minimum contacts
required by the Constitution."
' 33
The majority of courts have examined the cyberspace jurisdiction issue with
regard to specific jurisdiction.' However, some courts have stated that a basis
for general jurisdiction may exist. 5
29. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see Massachusetts School of
Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 142 E3d 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that "general jurisdiction"
exists where litigation at hand is not directly based on defendant's forum-related activities, but defendant has
engaged in continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to case, in forum state); Martin & Martin v. Jones, 616
E Supp. 339, 341 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (citing Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1171 (5th Cir.
1985)); see, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950); Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, Inc., 681 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1982); Hirsch v.
Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474 (9th Cir. 1986); Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.
Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392 (9th Cit. 1986); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244 (9th Cit. 1985).
30. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that court must determine whether exercise of jurisdiction
over defendant comports with traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice") (quoting International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
31. See Haisten, 784 E2d at 1392 (holding that California court could exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
insurer where insurer did not show compelling reason why exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and
where insurer purposefully directed its activities toward California).
32. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-78 (stating that this portion of the due process test is intended
to prevent plaintiffs' abuse of jurisdiction "to make litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party
unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent") (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)); Austin v. North Am. Forest Prods., 656 E2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cit. 1981) (stating
that factors to be considered are "whether the forum state has any special interest in exercising jurisdiction, and
whether the convenience of the parties favors litigating in another state").
33. STucKEv, supra note 9, § 10.02[2].
34. Kalow, supra'note 8, at 2250.
35. See Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 E Supp. 413, 417 (D, Ariz. 1996).
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In their application of traditional jurisdictional jurisprudence to cyberspace, the
courts must be ever mindful of its distinctive nature. 6 Many courts have analo-
gized the posting of information on a web site to Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Court of California's putting a product into the stream of commerce,
which results in jurisdiction if the nonresident defendant intended to reach a par-
ticular state.37 For example, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., the court
found jurisdiction based upon the web site, accessible by Massachusetts resi-
dents, combined with other activities, which could be interpreted as regularly
soliciting business in Massachusetts.'
Generally, however, the presence of a web site alone will not subject a nonresi-
dent to personal jurisdiction. 9 Otherwise, many courts are concerned that find-
ing jurisdiction based solely upon an Internet web site would equate to world-
36. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F Supp. 34, 36 (D. Mass. 1997). The Hasbro court deter-
mined that "current Internet jurisdictional case law has generally followed the Asahi reasoning, relying upon
facts other than the Web site in exercising jurisdiction." Id. at 42. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York properly observed that "much of the legal analysis of Internet-related issues has
focused on seeking a familiar analogy for the unfamiliar." American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F Supp.
160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Even the Supreme Court of the United States, at oral argument regarding the
Communications Decency Act, questioned whether the appropriate analogy for the Internet was television,
radio, newspaper, 900-line, or village green. Id. (citations omitted). Also, a number of metaphors have been
applied to the Internet, such as a highway to illustrate the expansiveness of the Internet, a shopping mall repre-
senting the commercial feature of the Internet, and a telephone line allowing people and computers to commu-
nicate. Edias Software, 947 F Supp. at 419 (citations omitted). In general, the courts must take a flexible
approach to ensure that International Shoe s minimum contact requirement remains the constitutional standard
for cyberspace jurisdiction. Christopher W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction
Around the Whole Wide World? 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1269, 1336 (1997).
37. See, e.g., Hasbro, 994 F Supp. at 42; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
38. Hasbro, 994 F Supp. at 44. However, the court noted its concerns regarding three recent cases which
"found that the existence of a Web site alone is enough to allow jurisdiction in any state." Id. at 46; see Inset
Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); and Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (all three cases
involved alleged trademark infringement with jurisdiction established because of the sites).
39. Generally, Internet web site advertisements and print advertisements alone are not sufficient to prove
that nonresident defendants purposefully availed themselves of a particular forum. Osteotech, Inc., v. Gensci
Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp.
327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (determining that an Internet web site is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
under a general jurisdiction theory when the information provided serves as an advertisement and not as a
means of conducting business) and Gehling v. St. George's School of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that advertising in national publications "does not constitute 'continuous and substantial' con-
tacts with the forum state")). Some courts have distinguished Internet advertisements, which cannot be thrown
away and are available 24 hours a day, from magazine advertisements, which may be quickly disposed of, and
from television advertisements, which are momentary. Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological, No. 97-0571,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *10 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997); cf Weber, 977 F Supp. at 333-34 (stating that
Internet advertising is the same as advertising in a national magazine); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug
Galleries, Inc., 999 F Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that defendant's passive web site is essentially an
advertisement and does not create jurisdiction); Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, L.L.C., 995 E
Supp. 761, 765 (W.D. Ky. 1997) (stating that "mere fact that Internet users in Kentucky can view advertise-
ments on web pages... falls far short of demonstrating that Defendants advertise in Kentucky"); E-Data Corp.
v. MicroPatent Corp., 989 E Supp. 173, 176-77 (D. Conn. 1997) (stating that jurisdiction based upon advertis-
ing alone would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in World-Wide Volkswagen); Inset Sys., 937
E Supp. at 161 (finding jurisdiction based upon web site); Maritz, 947 F Supp. at 1333 (stating that defendant
"consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all internet users, knowing that such information
will be transmitted globally. Thus [defendant's] contacts are of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, that they favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over defendant."); Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding juris-
diction based upon advertising and soliciting on the Internet).
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wide jurisdiction.40 In determining whether web activity may grant jurisdiction,
courts have employed a flexible, "sliding scale," which consists of the following
three classifications of Internet activity: (1) "situations where a defendant clear-
ly does business over the Internet" through which the defendant "enters into con-
tracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeat-
ed transmission of computer files over the Internet," which creates jurisdiction; '
(2) "'situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet
web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions,' i.e., a 'passive Web
site that does little more than make information available to those who are inter-
ested in it,"' which does not create jurisdiction;42 and (3) "[t]he middle ground,' ...
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host com-
puter," which is a situation requiring the court to consider "the level of interactiv-
ity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site in order to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
would be proper.""
A. Contractual Relationships
Traditionally, when an out-of-state defendant enters into a contract with a resi-
dent of the forum state, courts have not hesitated, under certain circumstances, to
assume jurisdiction over the defendant." Indeed, Mississippi's long-arm statute
expressly provides for jurisdiction over nonresidents who "make a contract with
a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this
40. Osteotech, 6 E Supp. 2d at 356. See also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir.
1997); Hasbro, 994 F Supp. at 41-47 (citing Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-Civ-3620, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 26, 1997) (granting jurisdiction would create national or worldwide jurisdiction)).
41. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F Supp. 1119, 1124 (WD. Pa. 1997). At this side of the
sliding scale are the cases where defendants are subjected to jurisdiction as a result of contractual relationships
involving the exchange of information over the Internet, such as the downloading and transmitting of files. See,
e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 E3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding jurisdiction proper).
42. Zippo, 952 E Supp. at 1124. This side of the sliding scale consists of cases with passive web sites,
where the defendant may only advertise on the Internet. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1996), aff d, 126 E3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that personal jurisdiction cannot be exer-
cised); cf Inset Sys., 937 F Supp. at 164 (finding personal jurisdiction proper because "advertising via the
Internet is solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature").
43. Zippo, 952 E Supp. at 1124. The middle of the sliding scale is made up of cases dealing with interac-
tive web sites, where courts must determine the extent and nature of activity. See, e.g., Maritz, 947 F Supp. at
1328.
44. Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 24, 1998) (citing Zippo, 952 E Supp. at 1123-24); see also Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No.
97 C 4943, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687 (N.D. I11. Nov. 12, 1997) (adopting the Zippo framework). See, e.g.,
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction proper in District of Columbia
resulting from web site interactivity with D.C. residents, distribution of Drudge Report through America
Online, electronic mail, and the world wide web to D.C. residents, solicitation and receipt of contributions from
D.C. residents, availability of the web site to D.C. residents, defendant's interview with C-SPAN in D.C.; and
defendant's communications with D.C. residents as information sources).
45. See, e.g., Peterson v. Highland Music Inc., 140 F3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Gusto Records,
Inc. v. Peterson, US__ 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F2d 617 (9th Cir. 1991); First
Miss. Corp. v. Thunderbird Energy, Inc., 876 E Supp. 840 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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state . . .. ,46 Generally, however, the mere entering into a contract with a resident
of the forum will not confer jurisdiction upon the forum state's courts.47 Nor is a
contract's choice of law provision alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 8 The
element almost universally required is that some part of the contract be per-
formed within the boundaries of the forum state. 9
In the landmark case of CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit carefully entered into the tangled web of
cyberspace jurisdiction." Patterson subscribed to CompuServe"' and entered into
a "Shareware Registration Agreement" with CompuServe, which allowed Patter-
son to place items of shareware on CompuServe's system to be used and purchased
by others.5 2 The district court held that the electronic connection between
Patterson and CompuServe was not sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. 3
However, despite the fact that Patterson's contacts were "almost entirely electronic
in nature,' 5 4 the Sixth Circuit found that it was reasonable for Ohio, the state of the
computer network service, to exercise jurisdiction over Patterson.5
46. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1998); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1993); Mellon Bank (East)
PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 E2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1992); Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954
F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1992); McLaurin v. Nazar, 883 F Supp. 112 (N.D. Miss. 1995), aff'd, 71 E3d 878 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that merely contracting with resident of forum state is insufficient to subject nonresident to
forum's jurisdiction); Angelica Corp. v. Gallery Mfg. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Hoag v.
Sweetwater Int'l, 857 F Supp. 1420 (D. Nev. 1994).
48. Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 E Supp. 111, 118 (D. Colo. 1992) (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)); GCI 1985-1 Ltd. v. Murray Properties Partnership of Dallas,
770 E Supp. 585, 589-90 (D. Colo. 1991).
49. Jones, 954 E2d at 1068.
50. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 E3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
51. CompuServe, a computer information service, was headquartered in Columbus, Ohio. Id. at 1260.
Patterson, a resident of the State of Texas, alleged that he had never visited Ohio. Id.
52. Id. The Shareware Registration Agreement, creating an independent contractor relationship, was
entered into by Patterson in Texas and transmitted to CompuServe in Ohio. Id. at 1261. The agreement stated
that it was entered into in Ohio. Id. at 1260. Patterson alleged that he sold less than $650.00 of software to
Ohio residents as a result of the relationship with CompuServe. Id. at 1261.
53. Id. at 1259-60. The appellate court found that the district court failed to recognize the most important
elements of the relationship between CompuServe and Patterson--"that Patterson chose to transmit his soft-
ware from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio, that myriad others gained access to Patterson's software via
that system, and that Patterson advertised and sold his product through that system." Id. at 1264.
54. Id. at 1262. The court compared this ruling to its previous pronouncement that:
[p]hysical presence of an agent is not necessary ... for the transaction of business in a state. The
soliciting of insurance by mail, the transmission of radio broadcasts into a state, and the sending of
magazines and newspapers into a state to be sold there by independent contractors are all accom-
plished without the physical presence of an agent; yet all have been held to constitute the transaction
of business in a state.
Id. at 1264 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 1263. The court expressly limited the applicability of its ruling. Id. at 1268. The court stated that
it need not and did not decide whether "Patterson would be subject to suit in any state where his software was
purchased or used ... [or whether CompuServe could] sue any regular subscriber to its service for nonpayment
in Ohio... ." Id; see also Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 E Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992)
(holding, under Colorado's "due process" long-arm statute, that nonresident defendant's contractual contacts
with forum were almost entirely electronic); cf Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d
1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1994) (holding that nonresident defendant was not subject to jurisdiction of forum
state courts where only contact with forum was failure to make payments in forum state to forum state resi-
dent).
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B. Web Sites
In general, courts seem unwilling to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants when their only contact with the forum state is based upon residents' par-
ticipation in a passive web site." Whether a court will assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident who maintains an interactive web site depends upon the quantity and
quality of the nonresident's contacts with the residents of the forum. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first analyzed the
application of personal jurisdiction in the context of cyberspace in Cybersell, Inc.
v. Cybersell, Inc." Cybersell Arizona registered the name "Cybersell" as a ser-
vice mark and operated a web site using the mark." Prior to the approval of
Cybersell Arizona's registration application, Cybersell Florida created an essen-
tially passive web page with the logo "CyberSell" on its home page. 0 Cybersell
Arizona filed suit in the United States District Court in Arizona against Cyber-
sell Florida for trademark infringement, unfair competition, fraud, and RICO
violations."1 Cybersell Florida sought dismissal based upon lack of personal
jurisdiction.2 The issue presented to the court was whether the use of an alleged
infringing service mark in a home page on the World Wide Web creates personal
jurisdiction in the state where the holder of the mark has its principal place of
business.6" After an examination of the distinction between interactive web sites
and passive web sites, ' the court concluded that it would not "comport with 'tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"' for a Florida web site adver-
56. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank, 796 F. Supp. 1333 (C.D. Cal. 1992). In
Resolution Trust, the court held that a nonresident's use of a nationwide clearinghouse, located in California, for
bank payments did not subject it to jurisdiction in California. Id. at 1335-36.
57. See infra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text.
58. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 E3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff, Cybersell, Inc., is an Arizona
corporation which will be referred to as Cybersell Arizona. Id. Cybersell, Inc., the defendant, is a Florida cor-
poration, which will be referred to as Cybersell Florida. Id.
59. Id. at 415. The application granting registration of the name "Cybersell" was approved and granted on
October 30, 1995. Id. The web site was operated from August 1994 until February 1995, when the web site
was taken down for reconstruction. Id.
60. Id. Cybersell Florida was formed in the summer of 1995 by two Florida residents. Id.
61. Id. at 416. Ironically, on the same day, Cybersell Florida filed a declaratory action in the Middle
District of Florida. Id. The Florida declaratory action was transferred and consolidated with the District of
Arizona action. Id. Arizona jurisdictional case law allowed Arizona to exercise "personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident litigant to the maximum extent allowed by the federal constitution." Id. (citations omitted).
Therefore, a nonresident litigant could be subjected to litigation in Arizona, "so long as doing so comports with
due process." Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 415. Cybersell Arizona alleged that Cybersell Florida could be subjected to litigation in Arizona
"because cyberspace is without borders and a web site which advertises a product or service is necessarily
intended for use on a world wide basis." Id.
64. Id. at 418. "Interactive" web sites allow users to exchange information with the host computer. Id. The
Cybersell court noted that "[c]ourts that have addressed interactive sites have looked to the 'level of interactivi-
ty and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site' to determine if sufficient
contacts exist to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. (citations omitted). The court also relied upon the
dated premise that "no court has ever held that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the
advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state." Id. (citing Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 968 F. Supp.
1356 (WD. Ark. 1997) (no jurisdiction over Hong Kong defendant who advertised in trade journal posted on
the Internet without sale of goods or services in Arkansas)).
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tiser, without any contacts with Arizona, other than maintaining a web site acces-
sible over the Internet for anyone, including Arizonans, to be held amenable to
suit in Arizona."5 The court stated that the "common thread" applied to resolve
similar jurisdictional questions was "'the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can
be constitutionally exercised which is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."'"s
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reexamined cyberspace jurisdictional
issues in Panavision International, L.P v. Toeppen" Panavision brought suit in
California, alleging that Toeppen "was in the business of stealing trademarks,
registering them as domain names on the Internet and then selling the domain
names to the rightful trademark owners."' Toeppen, a resident of the state of
Texas, argued that he was improperly subjected to jurisdiction in California. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the exercise
of jurisdiction over Toeppen was proper and did not offend due process70 because
Toeppen's conduct injured Panavision in California.71 However, the court was
quick to note that jurisdiction could not be maintained based solely upon regis-
tering a trademark and posting a web site.72 In order to subject a nonresident to
jurisdiction, there must be "'something more' to demonstrate that the defendant
65. Cybersell, 130 F3d at 415. The court, recognizing that some courts have considered the "number of
'hits' received by a web page from residents in the forum state," also noted that no Arizonan ever "hit"
Cybersell Florida's web site, except for Cybersell Arizona. Id. at 419. Also, there was no evidence of any
Arizonan signing up for Cybersell Florida's service, of any contracts entered into in Arizona, of any sales made
in Arizona, of any telephone calls made from Arizona, of any income earned from Arizona, or of any Internet
messages sent to Arizona. Id.
66. Id. Accordingly the court held that Cybersell Florida's contacts with Arizona were insufficient to estab-
lish "purposeful availment," as Cybersell Florida did not commit any act or consummate any transaction, or
perform any act to purposefully avail itself to Arizona. Id. at 419-20. Otherwise, the court cautioned, "every
complaint arising out of alleged trademark infringement on the Internet would automatically result in personal
jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff's principal place of business is located." Id. at 420; see also SF Hotel Co. v.
Energy Invs., Inc., 985 E Supp. 1032, 1034-35 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding no jurisdiction where defendant only
maintained a passive web site with no provision for direct communication between defendant and web site
accessor).
67. Panavision Int'l, L.P v. Toeppen, 141 E3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
68. Id. at 1319.
69. Id. at 1318. Toeppen alleged that his only contact with California was "insignificant, emanating solely
from his registration of domain names on the Internet, which he did in Illinois." Id. Toeppen further alleged
that he did not enter California or direct any activity toward Panavision in California. Id. at 1322.
70. Id. at 1323. The court applied the following three-part test to determine if specific jurisdiction could be
exercised:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or
perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which
arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.
Id. at 1320 (citing Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 E3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995)).
71. Panavision Int'l, 141 F3d at 1322. Toeppen had argued that if any injury occurred, it occurred in cyber-
space, not California. Id. Toeppen also argued that Panavision, a large organization, did not suffer an injury
only in one location. Id. n.2. However, the court rejected these arguments and held that a corporation may suf-
fer "the brunt of the harm" where it maintains its principal place of business. Id.
72. Id. at 1322.
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directed his activity toward the forum state."73 The "something more" require-
ment may be satisfied in numerous ways.74 When Florida corporations, with a
web site, sell boats to a Michigan dealer who shows the boats at an Illinois boat
show, the "something more requirement" for jurisdiction in Illinois has been ful-
filled.7" Also, "something more" may be an Internet site combined with a toll-
free telephone number and advertisements in four national trade publications."
In a case involving passive web sites, Weber v. Jolly Hotels, the court specifi-
cally found that the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who
merely advertises on the Internet would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.77 In Weber, the court rejected the proposition that Inter-
net advertising is tantamount to purposeful availment or directing activity at a
particular forum.78 It has been rationalized that a web site's sponsor cannot pur-
posefully direct activity, as the information does not seek out residents, but waits
for the resident to access it.79
73. Id; see also Gifford v. Bruce Strumpf, Inc., No. 97-70-B, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11876, at *5 (D. Me.
Aug. 7, 1997) (stating that "mere posting on the Internet of information that is accessible to non-resident users
is insufficient, without more, to confer personal jurisdiction"). Here, the "something more" requirement was
satisfied by Toeppen's "scheme to register Panavision's trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of
extorting money...." Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1322. It can be concluded that "the likelihood that person-
al jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F Supp. 1119,
1124 (WD. Pa. 1997).
74. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that it had specific jurisdiction
over defendants who had maintained a web site accessible to Texas residents, solicited customers at a trade
show in Texas, received orders from Texas distributors, and advertised in a magazine that may have had Texas
readers. Telephone Audio Prods., Inc. v. Smith, No. 3:97-CV-0863-P, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4101, at *8-9
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1998). However, the court declined to determine if "maintenance of a website alone or in
addition to isolated contacts with the forum is sufficient to maintain general jurisdiction." Id. at *6 n.4. The
district court noted that some courts had found personal jurisdiction based upon a web site and something
more. Id. at *8 n.5 (citing Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 E Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1997) (voluntarily
creating a national market through web site solicitation and other sales constitutes purposeful availment);
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F Supp. 456, 470 (D. Mass. 1997) (purposeful availment is
satisfied when a web site, arguably in violation of plaintiff's trademark rights and a licensing agreement, plainly
attracts the forum's residents); Zippo, 952 F Supp. at 1126 (conducting electronic commerce constitutes pur-
poseful availment); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (maintaining a
web site was sufficient for minimum contacts); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161, 165 (D.
Conn. 1996) (advertising via the Internet and maintaining a toll-free number are sufficient for defendant to pur-
posefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum)). The Telephone Audio Productions court
specifically did not determine "if the maintenance of the website alone is sufficient to sustain personal jurisdic-
tion'" Telephone Audio Prods, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4101, at *8 n.5. However, it did determine that the
web site, combined with the other contacts, was sufficient for specific jurisdiction. Id. at *9 n.5.
75. Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
24, 1998). Neither of the Florida corporations had ever registered to do business in Illinois or ever designed,
manufactured, leased, or sold products in Illinois. Id. at *4.
76. Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological, No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *14-15 (E.D. La.
July 11, 1997). The district court, however, cautioned that the Internet site, without something more, would not
be sufficient. Id. at *14.
77. Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 334 (D.N.J. 1997).
78. Id. The defendant, an Italian corporation, placed photographs, information, and telephone numbers
regarding its hotels on the Internet. Id. at 329.
79. Agar Corp., Inc. v. Multi-Fluid, Inc., No. 95-5105, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17121, at *8 (S.D. Tex. June
25, 1997). The Agar court determined that, while the nonresident defendant "may have reasonably anticipated
visits to its website by Texas residents and companies, it did not, nor could it, purposefully direct information to
Texas via its website." Id. at *10.
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In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, the court focused upon a state statute
governing jurisdiction."0 King, a resident of Missouri, began operating a club,
named "The Blue Note," in Missouri in 1980.81 King permitted a Missouri web
site design company to create a web site for his club.82 Bensusan Restaurant
Corporation, located in New York, alleged that its New York City club, named
"The Blue Note," was registered as a federal trademark." Subsequently, Ben-
susan Restaurant Corporation filed suit against King in the Southern District of
New York. 4 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, and the Second Circuit affirmed." Since the acts giving rise to the lawsuit
occurred in Missouri, the court found that Bensusan failed to allege that a tor-
tious act was committed in New York, as required under the New York long-arm
statute.88
C. Electronic Mail
In the context of communication by e-mail, there seems to be no reason that
the traditional analysis employed by the courts to communications via any other
medium would not apply. That is, a nonresident defendant who transmits tor-
tious information over the Internet may be subject to personal jurisdiction to the
same extent as those who do so by telephone or by mail.87 The Supreme Court,
in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, s addressed this dilemma, stating:
Jurisdiction... may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physi-
cally enter the forum State .... [I]t is an inescapable fact of modem commer-
cial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and
wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical
presence within a State .... So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'pur-
posefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have consistently
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there. 8
Simply put, in such a case, the standard three-part "specific jurisdiction" test
employed by the Burger King Court must be met. The subject activity/communi-
cation must be purposefully directed to the forum, the lawsuit must arise out of
80. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 E3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id. The New York City club, "The Blue Note," was registered as a federal trademark on May 14, 1985.
Id. at 26.
84. Id. at 27. Plaintiff alleged common law unfair competition and violations of Sections 32(1) and 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), and Section 3(c) of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 27.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 29. The authorization and creation of the web site occurred in Missouri, and "the use of the
words 'Blue Note' and the Blue Note logo on the site . . . were performed by persons physically present in
Missouri and not in New York." Id. Furthermore, even if Bensusan's injury occurred in New York, jurisdiction
would still be lacking under the New York long-arm statute. Id.
87. For a collection of cases addressing the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants' tortious
communications originating outside the forum state, see 24 A.L.R.3d 532 (1969).
88. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
89. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
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or relate to the communication, and the exercise of jurisdiction must comport
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Of course, whether
communicating by electronic mail or a more traditional medium, the defendant
need not be present in the forum state to find himself subject to personal juris-
diction there; he need only "purposefully" direct his efforts toward forum state
residents. 1
Thus, in Cody v. Ward,92 the court held that a California resident who transmit-
ted allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations to a Connecticut resident by phone,
electronic mail, and an on-line computer service talk forum was subject to juris-
diction in Connecticut. 3 The court reasoned that the defendant's contacts with
the Connecticut plaintiff "were substantial enough that he should reasonably
have anticipated being sued" in Connecticut. 4 Likewise, in Hall v. LaRonde, s
the court observed that "[t]here is no reason why the requisite minimum contacts
cannot be electronic."99 The court held that a New York resident, who conducted
all contract negotiations with a Californian by electronic mail and telephone, was
subject to the jurisdiction of California courts in a lawsuit alleging breach of that
contract and stated that "the use of electronic mail and the telephone by a party
in another state may establish sufficient minimum contacts with California to
support personal jurisdiction." 97  Also, in Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Conti-
nental Health Care Corp.," the court held that it had personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident who engaged in substantial electronic mail communication with the
plaintiff, a resident of the forum state.99 Although the defendant argued that he
had never set foot in the forum state, the court stated that "' [t]he footfalls' were
not physical, they were electronic. They were, nonetheless, footfalls."'
90. Id.; see, e.g., Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 E3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction proper where nonresident defendant committed intentional tortious acts which were
expressly aimed at forum state, which caused harm to plaintiff in that state, and which defendant knew or
should have known would be suffered in forum state); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (stating that
nonresident defendant who directs tortious activities toward forum state should reasonably expect to be "haled
into court there"); Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 1988); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 859 (11 th Cir. 1990); cf Thompson v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 755 F2d 1162, 1171 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that where nonresident defendant operates entirely
outside of forum state, mere fact that defendant's activities cause an effect within the state and that such effect
was foreseeable, is not alone sufficient to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction).
91. Charlie Fowler Evangelistic Ass'n, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 911 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990);
see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 E3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); Ziegler v. Indian River County,
64 E3d 470, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1995); Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
New York newspaper, which published allegedly defamatory article regarding California plaintiff, was subject
to jurisdiction of California court); Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253,258-59 (1 th Cir. 1996).
92. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997).
93. Id. at 45-47.
94. Id. at 47 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474-75).
95. Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
96. Id. at 402.
97. Id. at 400.
98. Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3523 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
99. Id. at "17-18.
100. Id. at *17.
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IV CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction has steadfastly evolved throughout a
period of remarkable change in our society. From the time of International Shoe
(1945) and extending to the year Asahi was decided (1987), the methods of com-
merce, travel, and communication changed so drastically that, with every new
development, the concern that the traditional rules of law were not designed to
deal with the change surfaced. This fear has proved to be unfounded, for not
only was the law of personal jurisdiction crafted in general terms, but the courts
have shown themselves to be flexible in applying established legal principles to
modem problems.
The situation we face today with the advent and widespread use of the Internet
does not create a new "area" requiring the adoption of new substantive law.
Instead, the Internet is merely a vehicle, much like communication by wire in the
19th century, by which commerce and communication can be performed. The
faithful application of traditional jurisdictional jurisprudence will prove that it is,
indeed, an adequate template for cyberspace jurisdictional issues.
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